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ABSTRACT 
This submission for PhD by publication consists of a portfolio of nine peer 
reviewed and published papers. The research presented in the portfolio 
contributes to theory, knowledge and discussion in the area of retail marketing. 
The common theme of the papers is competition in grocery retailing, and 
specifically the way that retail marketing strategy and supply chain relations 
affects retail competition and outcomes for consumers.   
While the nine papers share a common approach in how grocery retailers 
compete through pricing and product choices along with their trading terms with 
suppliers, each individual paper addresses a distinctive central question:  
 How does pricing competition change in the wake of a major merger in the 
retail grocery sector?   
 How do grocery retailers respond in their pricing, promotion and advertising 
to the onset of a macro-economic crisis?  
 Do grocery retailers encourage excessive consumption of alcohol by 
under-shifting excise duty increases on cheap alcohol?    
 Why do retailers use value size pricing and offer bargain prices on jumbo-
sized sugary drinks that encourages harmful excessive consumption?  
 Is retail buyer power over suppliers detrimental to competition?  
 In what circumstances might the development and promotion of brands and 
private labels be deleterious to consumers’ interests? 
 How should competition authorities and practitioners assess the extent of 
competition between brands and private labels?  
 How can the development of copycat private labels directly mimicking 
leading brands result in higher overall prices for consumers?  
 Do retailers manipulate grocery prices to favour private labels over brands? 
Beyond their academic research contribution, the findings and insights provided in 
the papers both individually and collectively have relevance to retailers, suppliers, 
consumers, regulators and policymakers in desiring to see an efficient, well-
functioning and dynamic grocery retail sector. 
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Introductory Chapter: Overview, Research Context and 
Contribution of the Research Papers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This submission for PhD by publication consists of a portfolio of nine peer 
reviewed and published papers. The research presented in the portfolio 
contributes to theory, knowledge and discussion in the area of retail marketing. 
The common theme of the papers is competition in grocery retailing, and 
specifically the way that retail marketing strategy and supply chain relations 
affects retail competition and outcomes for consumers.  Through a combination of 
empirical, analytical and competitive assessment studies, the set of papers and 
with my retail marketing contribution provide novel insights that offer a deeper 
understanding of how retailers compete through pricing and product choices in the 
context of grocery retailing and food purchases made by consumers. 
Table 1 (below) lists the nine research papers making up the portfolio, 
grouped under two headings.  The first set of four papers relate to marketing 
strategy, and specifically the pricing behaviour of grocery retailers and food 
vendors.  The first pair of papers (Paper 1 and Paper 2) cover pricing of the full 
range of grocery products, in turn examining how market consolidation and the 
economic crisis that began in 2007/8 affected pricing behaviour in UK grocery 
retailing.  The second pair of papers (Paper 3 and Paper 4) examine pricing of 
specific grocery product categories: examining how taxation affects the pricing of 
products where there are public health concerns about excessive consumption, 
respectively of cheap alcohol and large-size sugary drinks.  The second set of five 
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papers relate to supply chain relations and product choices for consumers.  The 
first paper (Paper 5) examines the means by which grocery retailers can use their 
buyer power to dictate trading terms with suppliers.  The remaining four papers 
(Paper 6, Paper 7, Paper 8, and Paper 9) examine analytically and empirically 
the consequences of the double-agent role that grocery retailers hold when 
serving as both customer and competitor to brand suppliers (selling nationally 
branded goods) in promoting their own store-branded private label goods as 
alternative product choices for consumers.1   
The nine publications with my retail marketing contribution demonstrate, in 
different ways, how strategic decisions over pricing and product choices influence 
retail competition and affect outcomes for consumers.  The research outputs that 
make up the portfolio collectively contribute to the understanding of the nature of 
competition and dynamics operating in the grocery industry and the interplay 
between retail competitors and their relations with suppliers.  They build on the 
existing literature to make individual contributions that help extend understanding 
and knowledge as to the way that retail grocery markets operate and their impact 
on participants. Specifically, the papers help with understanding how competitive 
interaction can influence marketing decisions, principally over prices and product 
choices offered to consumers. The findings and insights provided in the papers 
have relevance to retailers, suppliers, consumers, regulators and society in 
desiring to see an efficient, well-functioning and dynamic grocery retail sector. 
 
                                                           
1  As a definition, “private label” products encompass all merchandise sold under a retailer's brand. 
That brand can be the retailer's own name or a name created exclusively by that retailer.  
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Table 1: Portfolio of papers by literature themes 
 
Marketing Strategy and Pricing Behaviour in Grocery Retailing 
Paper 1 Chakraborty, R., Dobson, P., Seaton, J., and Waterson, M. (2014). 
“Market Consolidation and Pricing Developments in Grocery 
Retailing: A Case Study,” in Analysis of Competition Policy and 
Sectoral Regulation, Martin Peitz and Yossi Spiegel (eds.), Now 
Publishers, pp. 3-29, ISBN 978-981-4616-35-5 (peer reviewed book 
chapter) (25% contribution) 
Paper 2 Chakraborty, R., Dobson, P., Seaton, J., and Waterson, M. (2015). 
“Pricing in inflationary times: The penny drops.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 71-86 (peer reviewed journal article) (25% 
contribution) 
Paper 3 Ally, A., Meng, Y., Chakraborty, R., Dobson, P., Seaton, J., Holmes, 
J., Angus, C., Guo, Y., Hill-McManus, D., Brennan, A., and Meier, P. 
(2014). “Alcohol tax pass-through across the product and price 
range: Do retailers treat cheap alcohol differently?” Addiction, Vol. 
109, pp. 1994-2002 (peer reviewed journal article) (20% contribution) 
Paper 4 Dobson, P., Chakraborty, R., and Seaton, J. (2017). “Containing big 
soda: Countering inducements to buy large-size sugary drinks.” 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 75, pp. 185–191 (peer reviewed 
journal article) (30% contribution) 
 
Supply Chain Relations and Product Choice in Grocery Retailing 
Paper 5 Dobson, P., and Chakraborty, R. (2008). “Buyer Power and 
Competition in the UK Groceries Market.” Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 53, 
pp. 333-368 (peer reviewed journal article) (50% contribution) 
Paper 6 Dobson, P., and Chakraborty, R. (2009). “Private Labels and 
Branded Goods: Consumers’ ‘Horrors’ and ‘Heroes’, in Private 
Labels, Branded Goods and Competition Policy: The Changing 
Landscape of Retail Competition, A. Ezrachi and U. Bernitz (eds.), 
Oxford University Press, pp. 99-124, ISBN ISBN-10: 0199559376 
(peer reviewed book chapter) (50% contribution) 
Paper 7 Dobson, P., and Chakraborty, R. (2015). “Assessing Brand and 
Private Label Competition.” European Competition Law Review, Vol. 
36 (Issue 2), pp. 76-81 (peer reviewed journal article) (50% 
contribution) 
Paper 8 Dobson, P., and Chakraborty, R. (2014). “How Do National Brands 
and Store Brands Compete?” Centre for Competition Policy Working 
Paper 14-7, UEA Repository (Working paper) (Published) (50% 
contribution) 
Paper 9 Chakraborty, R. (2018). “Do Retailers Manipulate Prices to Favour 
Private Label over Brands?” Centre for Competition Policy Working 
Paper 18-2, UEA Repository (Working paper) (Published) (100% 
contribution) 
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This introductory chapter provides a commentary on the set of papers to 
explain their background, common theme and linkages, context in the literature, 
methodological approaches, research contribution, limitations, impact, and fit with 
an ongoing research agenda.    
The organisation of the chapter is as follows.  The next section covers the 
background to the research areas. Section 3 outlines the relevant literature and 
theoretical context for the portfolio.  Section 4 discusses the research approaches 
and findings of the portfolio.  Section 5 concludes the chapter by examining the 
contributions and limitations of the papers in the context of an ongoing research 
agenda that provides scope and opportunity for further research contributions. 
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2. Background to the research areas 
The nine papers represent contributions to the literature on retail marketing 
applied to grocery retailing.  The focus of the papers is on the prices and product 
choices that grocery retailers present to consumers.  The subject matter is highly 
pertinent in view of grocery shopping being an activity that the vast majority of 
households undertake and upon which a sizeable portion of their income is spent.  
Accordingly, having the assurance that prices and product choices meet 
consumers’ needs and provide them with good value is economically and socially 
important – not least since food is essential to life and healthy eating is essential 
to good public health.  Moreover, the subject matter is highly topical in view of 
continuing concerns about retailers’ market power and influence that can lead to 
distorted competition in both grocery retailing and grocery supply markets.  
Indeed, the UK competition authorities have undertaken a string of inquiries 
examining different competition concerns about the UK grocery retailing over the 
last two decades – e.g. CC (2000; 2003; 2008) and CMA (2015).  Thus, both in 
respect of the economic and social significance of the sector and concerns about 
its performance, the research analysis and findings in the nine papers are both 
pertinent and topical to understanding what competition delivers in grocery 
retailing for the greater good of society.   
This section explains the connections between the research and the 
developments that have been taking place in grocery retailing over the last two 
decades.  These developments have inspired and informed the research, and 
equally the research findings offer insights on these developments – so it is a two-
way road.  The focus here is on three specific developments: (i) competition and 
consolidation in grocery retailing; (ii) marketing strategy and pricing behaviour in 
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grocery retailing; and (iii) supply chain relations and product choice in grocery 
retailing.  The remainder of this section examines each of these developments in 
turn. 
 
2.1 Competition and consolidation in grocery retailing  
The advent of supermarkets in the post-war period heralded a move towards 
increasing concentration in grocery retailing around the world, as retail chains 
grew at the expense of smaller independent retailers.  In the UK, this 
concentration led to a handful of very large retail chains controlling most of the 
sales through supermarkets.  By 2000, the Competition Commission (CC 2000) 
reported that the leading 13 retailers controlled over 90% of sales through 
supermarkets (defined as having retail floor space exceeding 600 sq m).  
Subsequently, there was further consolidation in the sector.  In 2004, the merger 
between Morrisons and Safeway established a dominant “Big 4” group of grocery 
retailers: Tesco, Asda (owned by Walmart), Sainsbury’s and Morrisons.  Ongoing 
concerns about this oligopoly group controlling two-thirds of all UK grocery sales 
and three-quarters of sales through supermarkets led to a further sector 
investigation by the Competition Commission (CC 2008).  Since then there have 
been various smaller retailer mergers, but most activity has been in the 
convenience-store sector, where Tesco and Sainsbury’s acquired and developed 
large numbers of small stores to complement their existing network of 
supermarkets.  Nevertheless, in the last few years, new competition has emerged 
as German hard discounters Aldi and and Lidl have greatly expanded their store 
networks to compete aggressively on price with the mainstream supermarket 
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retailers.   The future may see yet further new competition as online grocery 
develops and new entrants like Amazon Fresh make inroads in terms of 
competing with the existing online retailers, which along with the large 
supermarket operators (notably Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s, Morrisons and 
Waitrose) includes online grocery retail specialists like Ocado.  
In terms of the analysis in the nine papers, most of the focus is on the Big 4 
mainstream grocery retailers, and particularly their domination of the market for 
one-stop grocery shoppers (i.e. consumers seeking to do a large main shopping 
trip whereby they purchase most of their weekly grocery needs in one go).  As 
large basket shoppers, these consumers represent the largest and most lucrative 
segment of the sector and their needs are predominantly met by shopping at 
superstores (with retail store space greater than 1500 square metres) selling in 
excess of 20,000 product lines.  The Big 4 control most of these stores and the 
only other major superstore retailers present operate differently with an upmarket 
positioning (like Waitrose and Marks & Spencer) or limited product lines (like 
Iceland, Aldi and Lidl).  Accordingly, the nature of competition amongst the Big 4 
takes on critical importance given their overall dominance of the sector and near 
complete dominance of the market for one-stop grocery shopping.  
Four of the nine papers (Paper 1, Paper 2, Paper 3 and Paper 9) undertake 
detailed analysis of the pricing used by the Big 4 retailers or at least the largest 
three retailers (Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury’s).  The timeframe for these empirical 
studies spans 2003 to 2012. Figure 1 shows (below) the market shares of the Big 
4 retailers over the longer period, from 1993 through to 2014. Both Tesco and 
Asda nearly doubled their market shares over the twenty-year period shown, while 
Sainsbury’s declined slightly and Morrisons/Safeway evened out over the period.   
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Figure 1: Long-term market shares of leading British grocery retailers (1993-
2014) 
 
 
Source: Kantar Worldpanel (shares based on consumer panel till roll data) 
Note: Morrisons Total refers to the combination of Morrisons and Safeway stores (which merged in 
March 2004) 
 
Paper 1 considers the impact of concentration changes on competition by 
examining how the 2004 Morrisons/Safeway merger affected price competition 
amongst the Big 4 in the subsequent three years.  However, this period predated 
the biggest sector-impacting event in that decade, which was the combination of 
the Financial Crisis and rampant global food price inflation that hit the sector in 
2007/8.  While food price inflation subsided relatively quickly, the Financial Crisis 
led to a prolonged period of economic austerity and recession in the UK, which 
undermined consumer spending and thus posed a major challenge to retailers 
keen to maintain sales and profits.  Paper 2 examines how the three biggest 
retailers responded to the economic crisis, showing how their pricing behaviour 
changed to mask the extent of basket price rises and so helped them ride out the 
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economic storm relatively well.  Paper 8 highlights how the onset of the economic 
crisis affected differently the prices of branded and private label goods. 
 
2.2 Marketing strategy and pricing behaviour in grocery retailing  
The Big 4 retailers have much in common beyond their shared dominance of 
the retail grocery sector (CC 2008).  Firstly, they are all national operators, so 
their store networks exist right across Britain and they compete with each directly 
in most local markets.  Secondly, the bulk of their sales come from operating 
superstores selling broadly similar and comparative product lines.  Thirdly, they 
continuously monitor and compare each other on prices (as witnessed through 
their comparative advertising).  Fourthly, and importantly for researching the 
pricing studies and data gathering, they all operate with national pricing (i.e. the 
same product price applies across their entire superstore network for the whole 
country).    
The combination of these four features mean that the retailers compete with 
each other directly and so we should expect their prices to be close and to 
observe them adopting similar pricing behaviour.  Paper 1 highlights how the 
Morrisons/Safeway merger resulted in closer price alignment amongst the Big 4 
retailers.  However, Paper 2 and Paper 8 show the effect of food inflation and the 
economic crisis was to reduce price alignment, resulting in greater price 
dispersion.  In particular, these latter two papers highlight how the retailers used a 
snowstorm of penny price cuts combined with numerous temporary price 
discounts to mask rising prices, but which in turn had the effect of reducing price 
matching in the market.  The highly detailed and disaggregated nature of the 
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pricing studies reveals new insights on grocery pricing that previous studies 
(which are predominantly US based) had not identified, notably on the extent of 
pricing flexibility and the extent of item-by-item price matching across retailers. 
However, beyond these market-wide effects, there is also interest in the 
pricing of particular products and the way that retailers behave in setting prices.  
For example, Paper 3 examines the pricing of alcoholic beverages and 
specifically the way that retailers pass on excise duty and VAT increases.  The 
empirical study reveals that taxes are under-shifted on cheap alcohol.  This 
finding poses a public health concern if it encourages excessive consumption of 
cheap alcohol and suggests that policymakers might be better to set minimum 
prices on alcohol to restrict consumption rather than rely on duty increases.  
Indeed, this is a policy move that the Scottish government is introducing in May 
2018.2 
In contrast, Paper 4 provides a theoretical contribution, examining why 
retailers might use “value size pricing” to provide large size sugary drinks with low 
unit prices while selling small size sugary drinks with high unit prices.  This is also 
an important policy topic in view of the imminent introduction in April 2018 of a 
Soft Drinks Industry Levy that will tax sugary drinks according to their sugar 
content.  The expectation is that this tax will raise £520m in its first year operation 
for the Exchequer.3  This paper provides important theoretical reasoning for why 
the levy as an excise tax is likely to be more effective than an equivalent sales tax 
(which some other countries have used instead). 
                                                           
2  For details, see http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Services/Alcohol/minimum-pricing (accessed 
4/1/2018). 
3  For details, see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/soft-drinks-industry-levy/soft-drinks-
industry-levy (accessed 4/1/2018).  
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2.3 Supply chain relations and product choice in grocery retailing  
Oligopolistic retailers controlling the bulk of retail sales might not just have 
market power in selling products (to raise retail prices and harm consumer 
welfare) but also in buying them (to lower supply prices and harm supplier 
welfare).  The issue of retailer buyer power came to the fore in the Competition 
Commission enquiry in 2000 (CC 2000). Buyer power can manifest itself either in 
terms of suppressing prices paid to suppliers or imposing contractual terms on 
suppliers (called vertical restraints) that favour retailers directly (e.g. through 
suppliers paying shelf space fees) or indirectly (e.g. by denying a rival access to 
the supplier).  Paper 5 reviews the evidence on buyer power from the Competition 
Commission’s inquiries in 2000 and its then ongoing enquiry in 2008 (CC 2008).  
A particularly contentious issue regarding buyer power is how grocery 
retailers treat suppliers of branded goods when the retailers are promoting their 
own copycat private label goods as alternatives for consumers.  In particular, for a 
brand producer this means that the retailer represents both its customer and its 
competitor. The resulting “double-agent” role that the retailer holds means that the 
brand producer faces both vertical competition and horizontal competition in terms 
of its relationship with the retailer.  Figure 2 depicts this relationship.  Here, private 
label provides a means of bargaining leverage for the retailer over the brand 
producer (by providing a credible disagreement option) as well as the opportunity 
to earn high margins on the private label by free-riding on the brand’s marketing 
efforts.  The result is that the brand producer has to offer more to gain shelf space 
(e.g. paying “pay to stay” fees or funding price promotions) but equally will feel 
that that the copycat private labels undermine its intellectual property rights by 
freeriding on its brand investments.   
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Figure 2: Supply Chain Competition and the Double-Agent Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Paper 6 and Paper 7 
The double-agent relationship raises both competition policy and intellectual 
property rights policy concerns.  Four of the papers consider these policy 
concerns in detail.  Paper 6 shows the positive and negative sides of competition 
between branded goods and lookalike private labels.  Paper 7 discusses the 
nature of their competitive relationship, suggesting how to conduct a competitive 
assessment as a guide for competition authorities and practitioners. Paper 8 
provides detailed analytical modelling of the vertical and horizontal competition 
aspects, showing the market conditions under which private label can act to 
reduce consumer welfare by raising average prices. Finally, Paper 9 provides 
empirical evidence on the pricing relationship between matched pairs of branded 
and private-label equivalent goods, showing the extent to which the Big 4 retailers 
treat these two types of goods differently in their pricing behaviour.  
Brand Private Label
Retailer
Consumers
Retailer 
control
Horizontal Competition
Vertical
Competition
Figure 1 – Supply Chain Competition
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3. Literature and theoretical context for the portfolio  
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the relevant themes 
from the literature, which underpin this PhD portfolio and, in so doing, highlight the 
important gaps within this body of literature. The portfolio of papers resides in the 
broad area of retail marketing and supply chain relations. Each of the papers 
contains its own literature review for theoretical context, but the purpose of this 
section is to draw together the three main research themes spanning the nine 
papers. Specifically, the first literature theme examines how powerful retailers 
dictate choices to consumers in terms of prices and product offers when 
competition is imperfect and consumers have limited options to shop around to 
secure the best value.  The second research theme examines how powerful 
retailers dictate trading terms to suppliers and control access to their stores and 
then on to consumers in their gatekeeper role.  The third research theme 
examines how powerful retailers develop private label goods to mimic branded 
goods which provide retailers with bargaining leverage over brand producers 
whilst also taking sales away from brand producers by favouring sales of high-
margin private label goods that free ride on the marketing investments made by 
brand producers. 
 
3.1 Retailers as choice controllers: dictating product offers to consumers  
Concern about the market power of retailers controlling retail markets and 
dictating prices and product choices to consumers has a long history.  The issue 
of retailer power first came to the fore in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s 
with the rise of the Atlantic & Pacific (“A&P”) chain, which grew from 650 outlets in 
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1919 to 15,700 outlets by 1930 (Tedlow 1990).  At the same time, other retail 
chains, like Kroeger, American Stores, Safeway and First National, grew rapidly 
such that by 1930 the top five chains controlled over a quarter of national grocery 
sales (Ellickson 2016). Policymakers concern about the growing power of these 
chains led to the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and other anti-trust measures to 
curtail the power of retail chains and prevent them using their size to negotiate 
more favourable terms over smaller retailers (Adelman 1959).  Retail power did 
not re-emerge as a major concern in the US until the rise of Walmart in 1990s and 
the growth of other large retail chains, where the national share of the top four US 
retailers rapidly increased from 17% in 1995 to 29% by 2000 and on to 36% by 
2005 (Ellickson 2016).   
In the UK and elsewhere in Europe, national-level market concentration in 
grocery retailing had steadily increased over the 1980s and 1990s (Clarke et al. 
2002; Burt and Sparks 2003; Dobson et al. 2003).  This gave rise to a growing 
concern that retailers might be able to exploit their selling power to raise prices to 
consumers and control terms with suppliers (Dobson and Waterson 1999).  In 
particular, the concern was that as retail markets became more concentrated then 
consumers would face reduced choice of where to shop which would in turn allow 
retailers to exploit their market power by raising prices.  A number of competition 
authority investigations had examined this matter, identifying a particular concern 
about high concentration in local markets allowing retailers to raise prices (e.g. 
CC 2000; 2003; 2008).  Smith (2004; 2006) provides detailed econometric 
evidence of how higher prices result from the restriction of consumer choice at the 
local level.  Studies examining the effects on local pricing following retail mergers 
in other countries provide similar findings showing a positive association between 
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raised local concentration and higher prices (Hosken et al. 2012; Alain et al. 
2017).  However, beyond showing a link between higher concentration and high 
prices, these sector inquiries and econometric analyses do not resolve the means 
by which retailers take advantage of reduced competition to raise prices, and 
specifically the way their pricing strategies adapt to exploit their increasing market 
power.  These matters are core contributions of Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 9.  
The marketing literature on pricing strategy focuses on differences between 
two main pricing strategies in grocery retailing: stable “everyday low prices” 
(“EDLP”) and variable “high-low” (“HiLo”) promotional pricing.  Ellickson and Misra 
(2008) chart how these two strategies, along with a hybrid strategy combining 
EDLP and HiLo pricing, have come to characterise and distinguish US 
supermarket retailers.  Bolton and Shankar (2003) and other researchers view 
pricing strategies less as fixed points and dichotomous choices and more as 
being positions on a broad spectrum (Fassnacht and El Husseini 2013).  Even so, 
an important characteristic that distinguishes EDLP and HiLo retailing is basket 
size and composition: where EDLP appeals more to large basket shoppers and 
HiLo appeals more to small basket shoppers (Bell and Latin 1998).   
In the UK, though, the differences on pricing strategy amongst the top 
retailers are less stark.  The Big 4 retailers adopt similar pricing strategies, which 
tend to be hybrid in nature, but leaning more towards EDLP in the case of Asda 
(owned by Walmart) and more towards HiLo in the case of Sainsbury’s, with 
Tesco and Morrisons somewhere in between (CC 2000; 2008).  Moreover, former 
extreme HiLo promotional retailers like Safeway and Somerfield have exited the 
market, respectively taken over by Morrisons and the Co-op (which now focuses 
exclusively on convenience store retailing having sold off its large stores).  A key 
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contribution of Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 9 is to show just how similarly the Big 
4 retailers price, especially after Morrisons acquired Safeway in 2004.  In 
particular, the papers show that with the UK retailers using national pricing (as 
opposed to local pricing which is prevalent in other countries like the US and 
France), their close monitoring of each other’s prices results in generally close 
pricing alignment. 
US studies point to most price variation in grocery retailing arising from 
temporary price discounts (Hosken and Reiffen 2004; 2007; Chen et al. 2008) and 
prices tend otherwise to be sticky (and so not always adjusting to cost changes) 
(Nakamura and Steinsson 2008; 2013).   A key contribution of Paper 1, Paper 2 
and Paper 9 is to show how flexible are prices in the UK, particularly amongst 
branded goods, where in addition to frequent large temporary price reductions 
there are also regular tiny price adjustments, notably price cuts of a single penny.  
US studies also point to price dispersion in retail grocery markets (i.e. 
significant variation in prices across different retailers) (Kaplan and Menzio 2015).  
In contrast, a key contribution of Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 9 is to show how 
closely the major UK retailers price grocery items, particularly for branded goods.  
The picture of retail competition that emerges through these three papers is 
that the major UK grocery retailers adopt very similar pricing behaviour, but a 
persistent concern is that their close monitoring of each other’s prices may mean 
that they avoid unduly intense price competition.  Thus media talk of the UK 
retailers fighting price wars may be more about promotional price discounting 
(Hickman 2009; Wallop 2014), rather than genuine price wars witnessed in other 
countries (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2008).  
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Beyond general price levels, academic research has examined particular 
pricing tactics used by retailers to extract more value (i.e. consumer surplus) from 
sales.  In some cases, this is about segmenting consumers and setting prices that 
are closer to consumers’ willingness to pay for products.  Direct price 
discrimination (charging different prices to different customers for the same good) 
offers one means.  For example, this could apply with charging different prices in 
different stores because competition is less in some geographical markets than in 
others (Dobson and Waterson 2005). However, the move to national pricing in the 
UK has ruled out this concern about the anti-competitive nature of “local price 
flexing” (CC 2000; 2008).   
Nevertheless, even if direct discrimination is not possible, retailers might still 
be able to use indirect methods of price discrimination by increasing product 
choice and then offering different prices to appeal to different consumer 
segments.  For instance, offering both brands and private label equivalents could 
serve this purpose (Soberman and Parker 2006; Gabrielsen and Sørgard 2007, 
Perloff et al. 2012).  Paper 8 develops the theory on this subject while Paper 9 
provides empirical evidence.  Alternatively, retailers might offer different product 
sizes to segment consumers with nonlinear pricing (Dolan 1987; Cohen 2008; 
Dobson and Gerstner 2010).  Paper 4 develops a particular application of this 
theory on the pricing of sugary drinks to show why retailers use “value size 
pricing”. This pricing tactic entails charging a low unit price on a large size and a 
high unit price on a small size, such that the overall price of the former is only 
slightly higher than the latter – thereby providing an incentive for value-conscious 
consumers to supersize their sugary drinks. 
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Additionally, retailers may have flexibility in how they price their retail 
assortments, choosing to set high margins on some products and lower margins 
on other products in terms of multiproduct pricing (Bliss 1988; Giulietti and 
Waterson 1997; Rhodes 2014; Thomassen et al. 2017).  In particular, price rivalry 
might be more intense on some products because consumers seeking to buy 
those products are more price conscious and willing to shop around for the best 
prices, even to the point where they might represent “loss leaders” (Johnson 
2017).  This can mean that retailers might not pass through cost changes on to 
retail prices evenly across products (Weyl and Fabinger 2013; Hong and Li 2017).  
Paper 3 provides empirical evidence on this matter in respect of alcohol pricing, 
showing that grocery retailers undershift tax increases on cheap alcohol, which 
has a public health concern because it could encourage excessive alcohol 
consumption. 
 
3.2 Retailers as gatekeepers: dictating terms and access for suppliers  
As well as concerns about how retailers with market power might raise and 
distort prices to consumers for the purposes of earning higher profits, concerns 
also apply to retailers’ power as buyers over suppliers.  In principle, supply chain 
management should be a collaborative partnership with suppliers and retailers 
working well together to deliver consumers good quality products at low prices 
through efficient operations (Dani 2015).  In practice, while necessarily 
collaborative, a tension exists between suppliers and retailers over the division of 
profits and suppliers’ and retailers’ interests might not be exactly aligned.  
Specifically, retailers might wish to exploit their positions as “gatekeepers” in 
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providing suppliers with access to their supermarket shelves but only if offered 
favourable terms (Grimes 2005).  Here, buying power may arise in the form of 
suppliers offering supply price discounts or paying fees (e.g. access fees, slotting 
allowances, or pay-to-stay fees) to gain access to retail stores (Dobson and 
Waterson 1999; Bloom et al. 2000).  Retail buyer power becomes a policy 
concern when it can restrict, distort or prevent competition at the retail or supply 
level (Clarke et al. 2002; Dobson 2005; Carstensen 2017).  
The UK Competition Commission’s 2000 inquiry revealed a positive 
relationship between retailer size and the level of discounts obtained from 
suppliers (CC 2000).  The inquiry also showed the extent of retailer imposed 
vertical restraints on suppliers, many of which could distort competition (e.g. by 
reducing supplier efficiency and putting smaller retailers at a competitive 
disadvantage) and have an adverse effect on consumer welfare (when resulting in 
reduced product choice, quality or innovation or higher retail prices). The 
Competition Commission’s inquiry led to the Supermarkets Code of Practice 
(SCOP) in 2001, intended to curb anticompetitive retailer buyer power.  However, 
concerns about retailer buyer power continued, and the Competition Commission 
undertook a further sector inquiry during 2006-8.  Paper 5 reviews the evidence 
and arguments on the effects of buyer power in UK grocery retailing, pre-empting 
the findings of the Commission’s final report released in April 2008 (CC 2008).   
 
3.3 Retailers as double agents: leveraging private label for advantage  
While retailers may possess both selling and buying power, brand producers 
may still have market power of their own when consumers strongly demand their 
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goods.  When a brand achieves the iconic status of a “must stock product” (i.e. 
brand loyalty is so strong that consumers will not buy an alternative product) then 
retailers can ill afford not to trade with the brand producer.4  This gives the brand 
producer bargaining power over a retailer.  However, if the retailer can encourage 
shoppers to switch to buying private label instead then it weakens the brand 
producer’s bargaining power while at the same time presents an opportunity to 
market its own good, earning the retailer a high margin.  In this context, the 
retailer is a double agent for the brand producer in serving as both its customer 
and competitor (Bell et al. 1997; Dobson 1998, 2005).  
The literature on private labels and their competition with brands has 
developed rapidly over the last two decades, as numerous literature surveys 
show, e.g. Bergès-Sennou et al. (2004), Sayman and Raju (2007), Pauwels and 
Srinivasan (2009), Sethuraman (2009), Hyman et al. (2010), Sethuraman and 
Raju (2012) and Sethuraman and Gielens (2014).  Four of the nine papers in the 
PhD portfolio contribute to this literature in distinctive and complementary ways.   
First, Paper 6 contrasts examples where brands and private can be a 
positive competitive force in benefitting consumers against situations where they 
represent an anticompetitive force that harms consumers.  To emphasise the 
stark differences, the paper portrays the examples in terms of ‘horrors’ and 
‘heroes’, with deliberately chosen names and characterisations that are larger 
                                                           
4  As an illustration, in assessing the merger between Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Gillette in 
2005, the European Commission (Case No. COMP/M.3732) identified the two respective 
companies as having a total of 21 “must stock brands”.  For P&G the brands were Ariel, Pringles, 
Dreft, Olay, Tampax, Always, Pampers, Swifter, Fairy, Head & Shoulders, Pantene, Wella, Iams 
and Eukanuba, and for Gillette they were Oral B, Gillette razors and blades, Duracell, and Braun. 
See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3732_20050715_20212_en.pdf 
(accessed 6/1/2018). 
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than life. The ‘horrors’ are monsters from B-movie horror films. The ‘heroes’ come 
straight out of Hollywood action and adventure movies. Table 2 summarises them. 
 
Table 2: Brand and private label ‘horrors’ and ‘heroes’ 
 Manufacturer brands  Retailer private labels 
 Character Features  Character Features 
‘Horrors’ 
Consumers’ 
nightmares 
‘The blob’  Smothers 
competition, 
restricts innovation 
and deters entry 
 ‘The blood 
sucker’ 
Bleeds dry 
innovative effort 
by free riding on 
brand investments 
‘The giant 
octopus’ 
Tentacles 
everywhere to 
leverage portfolio 
power 
 ‘The flesh 
eater’ 
Slowly devours 
brands by 
undermining them 
in-store 
‘The virus’ Proliferates brand 
variants to spread 
its category control 
 ‘The body 
snatcher’ 
Copies then 
replaces brands 
with look-alike 
products 
‘Heroes’ 
Consumers’ 
sweet 
dreams 
‘The protector’ Offers quality, 
value, consistency 
and trustworthiness 
 ‘The underdog’ Takes on the 
strongest brands 
to challenge their 
dominance 
‘The pioneer’ Innovates to 
provide new or 
improved products 
for consumers 
 ‘The 
adventurer’ 
Opens up new 
product categories 
with new ranges 
of products 
‘The equalizer’ Enters from 
adjacent markets to 
neutralize existing 
market power 
 ‘The 
revolutionary 
Challenges 
brands by offering 
real value and 
choice for the 
masses 
Source: Paper 6 
 
Second, referring to the vertical/horizontal competition relationship shown in 
Figure 2 (above), Paper 7 discusses and explains how price and non-price 
competition interact through the mixed vertical-horizontal relationships arising 
from the presence of private label.  The paper offers guidance to researchers and 
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practitioners undertaking competitive assessments in considering the implications 
of these relationships for assessing competition and particularly the care required 
with market definition analysis. 
Third, Paper 8 uses analytical modelling to address a fundamental question 
about how brands and private labels compete.  Even though consumers might 
view them as substitutes, the two types of goods represent complements to the 
retailer selling them, because each of them may appeal distinctively to different 
consumer segments so they each have a place in the retailers’ product 
assortment.  However, this in turn may mean that the way the retailer prices them 
is more about segmenting consumers rather than pitting the products directly 
against each other in terms of their prices.  The upshot is that consumers might 
not see the benefits of lower prices through head-to-head competition between 
brands and private labels.  However, relaxing public policy against resale price 
maintenance (RPM) and strengthening intellectual property rights laws against 
parasitic copycatting might strengthen a brand producer’s bargaining position, but 
the modelling also shows that these moves might also benefit consumers by 
stimulating greater head-to-head pricing competition. 
Fourth, Paper 9 provides empirical evidence on whether retailers manipulate 
retail prices on brands to favour private label.  The evidence shows that while 
retailers treat the pricing of branded goods differently to those of equivalent me-
too private labels, the pricing appears aimed more at segmenting consumers, and 
using the two product types as a combination, rather than deliberately 
undermining brands.  The paper shows how the economic crisis in 2008 
exacerbated pricing differences, principally as retailers struggled in difficult market 
circumstances to maintain sales levels and resorted to using promotional pricing. 
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4. Research approaches and contributions of the portfolio  
The nine papers in the portfolio represent a blend of empirical and analytical 
contributions along with competitive assessment analysis for examining public 
policy interventions.  This section outlines the research approaches in the papers 
and linkages in terms of theoretical context and the empirical methods used.  The 
section first covers the empirical analysis used (which applies to six of the nine 
papers), then the formal analytical modelling analysis used (which applies to two 
papers), and finally the competitive assessment and policy analysis used (which 
applies centrally to one paper but used in conjunction with other analyses in the 
other eight papers). 
To provide an overview, and help serve as a reading guide to this section, 
Table 3 summarises the research approaches and study methods for each paper. 
Table 3: Research approaches and study methods 
Paper # Topic Marketing 
variable 
Approach Method Data type Data sources 
Paper 1 Market 
consolidation 
Retail prices Empirical Statistics Balanced 
panel data 
Tesco Price Check 
Paper 2 Price 
changes 
Retail prices Empirical Statistics and 
econometrics 
Balanced 
panel data 
Tesco Price Check 
& mySupermarket 
Paper 3 Alcohol tax 
pass-through 
Retail prices Empirical Econometrics Unbalanced 
panel data 
mySupermarket 
Paper 4 Quantity 
discounts 
Retail prices Analytical Mathematical 
optimisation 
N/A N/A 
Paper 5 Retail buyer 
power 
Supply 
trading terms 
Empirical Summary 
statistics 
Secondary 
sourced data 
Competition 
Commission 
Paper 6 Brands and 
PL choice 
Products and 
retail prices 
Empirical Summary 
statistics 
Secondary 
sourced data 
Marketing reports 
Paper 7 Competition 
assessment 
Retail prices Analytical Competition 
assessment 
N/A N/A 
Paper 8 Consumer 
segmentation 
Retail prices Analytical Game theory N/A N/A 
Paper 9 Retail price 
manipulation 
Retail prices Empirical Statistics Balanced 
panel data 
Tesco Price Check 
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4.1 Empirical analysis of pricing and product choices 
The empirical contributions concern the study of competitive interaction 
amongst the UK’s leading grocery retailers.  In particular, through building and 
applying largescale panel datasets of weekly prices on grocery products over 
several years, the papers cover different questions about the nature of pricing 
competition.  Some of these questions apply broadly to grocery products, such as 
how structural changes (like the Morrisons/Safeway merger in 2004) or macro-
economic conditions (like the onset of the financial crisis in 2008) affected grocery 
prices.  Other questions are more specific to particular types of grocery products, 
such as how UK retailers pass through excise duty increases on alcoholic drinks 
prices or whether UK retailers price branded goods and their private-label 
equivalents in the same manner.  In addition to the construction and analysis of 
panel datasets, the papers also draw on secondary-sourced data from marketing 
agencies and governmental bodies to provide specific contextual information. 
The papers providing empirical analysis relate specifically to the UK retail 
grocery sector.  The empirical analysis covers a period of significant change in UK 
grocery retailing in the last 15 years.  Paper 1 examines the impact of market 
consolidation, using the Safeway/Morrisons merger in 2004 as a case study.  
Paper 2 and Paper 9 consider how pricing behaviour changes as macro-
economic conditions change, examining the impact of the UK economy moving 
from a period of economic stability to economic crisis over 2007/8 .  Paper 5 and 
Paper 6 chart how both these market impacts respectively influenced supply 
chain relations and the development of private label in grocery retailing.  Paper 3 
provides more focused coverage, examining how retailers apply different tax 
pass-through rates with excise duty changes on alcohol prices.  
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Four of these papers - Paper 1, Paper 2, Paper 3 and Paper 9 – utilise 
largescale panel datasets of weekly prices on grocery products over several years 
from the leading UK grocery retailers.  The papers use these panel data to 
examine different aspects about the nature of pricing competition in UK grocery 
retailing.  The panel data come from two key sources.  Firstly, we collected weekly 
updated price data from November 2003 to November 2008 via Tesco’s online 
price comparison service “Price Check” (tesco.com/pricecheck). Initially, the 
Tesco site covered just over 4000 product lines but later expanded to over 10000 
items, with weekly updated price comparisons made against Sainsbury’s, Asda 
and Safeway (and later against Morrisons after it acquired Safeway in 2004).  The 
second panel data is from the independent price comparison website of 
mySupermarket.co.uk, with data collected from February 2008 through to 2014 
covering prices from Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Ocado.  Missing observations 
restrict the number of products for which data were available over long series of 
weeks running into five or seven years, but the sample sizes are still impressive 
when taking into account that they generally cover hundreds of items over 
hundreds of weeks across three or four retailers.  
Paper 1 uses panel data from Tesco Price Check to examine how structural 
changes resulting from the Morrisons/Safeway merger affected price competition 
for grocery products amongst the Big 4 retailers, based on a sample of 539 
packaged grocery products over a three-year period (2003-2006) with a total of 
278,124 price observations.  The analysis contrasts pre-merger and post-merger 
pricing, examining price levels, the direction of price changes (rises vs. falls), and 
the magnitudes of price adjustments (in pence).  Further analysis covers the 
extent of price alignment across the four retailers (measured by the extent of price 
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dispersion across the retailers over time), and the volatility of prices across 
product categories (measured by weekly price churn rates).  The paper concludes 
by examining the extent of leader-follower behaviour amongst the retailers 
(measured by the extent of symmetry of competitor price changes around the time 
of a firm’s price change) and contrasts behaviour before and after the merger.      
Paper 2 uses panel data combined from Tesco Price Check and 
mySupermarket to examine how changes in macro-economic conditions and 
particularly the onset of food inflation and the economic crisis in 2007/8 affected 
pricing behaviour adopted by the top three retailers. The analysis used a sample 
of 370 packaged grocery products over a seven-year period (2003-2010), 
covering 366 consecutive weeks, totalling 406,260 price observations.  The study 
examines the asymmetry between price cuts (tending to be small and frequent 
with a mode of 1p) and price rises (tending to be large and infrequent with a mode 
of 10p).  The paper applies different tests (including regression analysis) to 
determine if the retailers use manifold penny price cuts in conjunction with 
temporary price reductions (TPRs) as an obfuscation strategy to hide sharp price 
increases resulting in higher basket overall prices. 
Paper 3 restricts attention to alcohol products and uses panel price data on 
254 alcohol products with weekly data from March 2008 to August 2011 (178 
weeks) from mySupermarket to assess the extent to which four grocery retailers 
passed on excise duty and VAT rate changes through adjustments to retail prices.  
The paper uses quantile regression analysis to examine tax pass-through rates on 
different price-categories (i.e. price bands) in steps from the cheapest to the most 
expensive alcohol products.  This regression technique is especially useful in the 
context of this study as the interest is to see whether tax increases raise prices 
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proportionately across all price bands, and in particular whether the retailers 
under-shift tax (i.e. not fully pass-through duty increases) on cheap alcohol, which 
might encourage excessive consumption.5 
Paper 9 uses panel data from Tesco Price Check for 60 branded goods 
matched against private label equivalents from each of the Big 4 retailers (so 300 
different items in total) to examine how the retailers set and adjust the prices of 
the branded goods compared to the private label goods. The period covers 264 
weeks (2003-2008) and the panel consists of 126,720 price observations.  Using 
the panel, the empirical analysis considers: (i) price correlations between the 
matched pairs and across the retailers; (ii) price gaps between brands and private 
labels; (iii) differences in price matching across the retailers for brands and private 
labels over time; and (iv) price volatility of brands and private labels over time.  
The paper examines factors affecting these measures regarding product category 
characteristics, private label shares, and retailers’ relative category positions.  
In addition to the construction and analysis of panel datasets, the above four 
papers also draw on secondary-sourced data from marketing agencies (Nielsen 
and Kantar) to provide specific contextual information relating to product 
characteristics and retailers’ relative positions for regression analysis.   
                                                           
5 The advantage in using quantile regression is providing flexibility for modelling the entire 
distribution of product prices.  Rather than focusing only on the mean, as in classical mean 
regression, quantile regression focuses on quantiles that refer to defined points in the distribution. 
For example, the 0.5 quantile is the median and 0.1 is the 10th percentile of the distribution. Hence, 
this methodology provides a framework for investigating differential pass-through for price points 
(i.e. quantiles) in the price distribution, e.g. to see if the pass-through rates are different for cheap 
alcohol compared to expensive alcohol. Furthermore, as quantile regression does not impose 
assumptions of normality of error terms and constant variance it is superior to the mean regression 
in this context, as it can capture features such as skewness and heterogeneity which are 
inherently embedded within price data. 
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Paper 5 and Paper 6 take a different empirical approach and instead of 
examining product prices, they focus more on general market impacts and trends 
in terms of developments within the sector, respectively examining supply chain 
relations and the development of private label in grocery retailing.  These papers 
draw on secondary-sourced data from marketing agencies (Nielsen and Kantar) 
and government bodies (principally the Competition Commission) and provide 
summary information and descriptive statistics to support the narrative and 
arguments developed in the papers.   
4.2 Analytical models of pricing and product choices 
The analytical papers, Paper 4 and Paper 8, complement the empirical 
papers by investigating specific aspects of pricing and product choices that can 
work against societal interests: either because particular prices are too low or too 
high.  Paper 4 addresses the former, in demonstrating why “value size pricing” 
might be profitable for food retailers to offer “bargain” low prices on jumbo-sized 
sugary drinks targeted at value-conscious consumers while setting “rip-off” high 
prices on small-sized sugary drinks targeted at health-conscious consumers.  
Paper 8 addresses the latter, in demonstrating why retailers might deliberately 
inflate brand prices when introducing private-label equivalents to profit by 
segmenting quality-conscious “brand loyal” consumers from value-conscious 
“switcher” consumers. 
Despite looking at very different issues, both papers have a common theme 
in examining how food retailers can use consumer self-selection segmentation 
(i.e. second-degree price discrimination) to increase profits. This involves the 
retailer deliberately increasing product choice – in terms of offering either different 
product sizes or different product qualities – and then pricing the varieties such 
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that the combination of each variety and its price appeals to one segment but puts 
off another segment.  For example, a grocery retailer might introduce a “large” 
size product variant offered at a lower unit price compared to a “small” size 
offered at a higher unit price, where the large size appeals to value-conscious 
large households and the small size appeals to size-conscious small households 
(e.g. seeking to reduce excessive consumption or food waste).  As another 
example, a grocery retailer might introduce a “low” quality product variant offered 
with a low unit price compared to a “high” quality variant with a high unit price, 
where the former appeals to value-conscious consumers and the latter to quality-
conscious consumers.  This segmentation approach will be profitable to the 
retailer when it can extract proportionately more value (i.e. consumer surplus) 
from those shoppers prepared to buy the product variant with the high unit price 
and/or when it allows for increased total sales. 
In examining the application of self-selection segmentation strategies, both 
papers use formal analytical modelling using marketing and economic theory to 
model market behaviour and the effects of retailers’ decisions on consumer 
welfare.  The focus in Paper 4 is on understanding the motivation for food 
vendors to use “value size pricing” in offering supersized sugary drinks at bargain 
prices (targeted at value-conscious consumers) while over-charging for smaller 
sized sugary drinks (targeted at health-conscious consumers) and how 
governments might best intervene to curb excessive consumption.  The focus in 
Paper 8 is to show why more product choice can sometimes leave consumers 
worse off – such as how retailers can offer both brands and private label 
equivalents to segment consumers (between “brand loyal” and “switcher” 
consumers) and result in higher average prices. 
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Thus despite appearing to be very different subjects, Paper 4 and Paper 8 
examine fundamentally the same question in respect of would societal welfare be 
increased if product choice were reduced.  In Paper 4, the issue is about 
prohibiting or taking away the incentive to buy large size sugary drinks that result 
in excessive and harmful consumption (because these fuel obesity and lead to ill-
health in the long term so a public health concern).  In Paper 8, the issue is about 
consumer welfare and the circumstances under which this would be higher in the 
absence of copycat private label products that mimic brands but serve only to 
allow retailers to segment consumers, so pushes up average prices and allows 
the retailer to gain but at consumers’ expense.  In both papers, the overall effect 
rests on the impact on aggregate welfare, i.e. economic surplus for all market 
participants (taken to be profit for firms plus consumer surplus measured as the 
difference between the price paid and the willingness-to-pay level).  However, the 
analyses highlight distributional issues as well; showing the tension arising from 
different consumer segments having different preferences, so that one segment 
may gain while the other loses out from more or less product choice. 
4.3 Competitive assessment and policy analysis 
A common element to all nine papers is a public policy dimension because 
competition and coordination in grocery markets might not always yield 
economically and socially optimal outcomes, giving rise to a role for government 
intervention in some contexts to improve outcomes.  Such a role could exist 
because the profit motive drives retailers to present consumers with purchasing 
choices that are privately profitable but socially deleterious. Paper 3 and Paper 4 
respectively considers this aspect in the context of heavily taxing alcoholic and 
sugary drinks to curb harmful excessive consumption that is harmful to health.  
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More generally, broad-based competitive assessments are required in judging the 
extent to which competition is effective in delivering efficient and welfare-
enhancing outcomes.  Paper 5 considers the evidence regarding how the leading 
grocery retailers exercise their buying power over suppliers and whether this is 
anti-competitive and leads to outcomes that serve against consumers’ interests.  
Paper 7 provides guidance to researchers and practitioners on assessing 
competition between branded goods and their private label equivalents.   
Thus at the heart of the nine papers is a welfare perspective on the impact of 
marketing decisions and supply chain relations in how this affects the firms 
participating in the industry (i.e. retailers and suppliers) and the impact on their 
customers (i.e. shoppers) and society at large.  Eight of the papers undertake 
competitive assessment analysis as part of the formal empirical analysis (i.e. in 
Paper 1, Paper 2, Paper 3, and Paper 9), descriptive empirical analysis (i.e. in 
Paper 5 and Paper 6) or theoretical analysis (i.e. in Paper 4 and Paper 8).  
However, the remaining paper, Paper 7, entirely focuses on arguments and logic 
rather than formal empirical assessment or analytical modelling for its insights and 
contribution.  Specifically, the paper is about how to conduct competitive 
assessments, so offers a methodological contribution intended to benefit 
competition authorities and practitioners undertaking such assessments.  This is 
in the context of analysing competition between branded and private label goods, 
which might be relevant to merger inquiries or anti-competitive practice cases.  
The paper draws on insights from the existing literature but also from my own 
papers, notably Paper 8 (which it cites) as well as Paper 2, Paper 6 and Paper 9.  
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5. Contributions, limitations and future research agenda  
The combined contribution of the nine publications is to help provide further 
understanding of the nature and consequences of the marketing and operations of 
grocery retailers affecting retailers, suppliers and consumers.  More specifically, 
the nine papers provide complementary insights on the nature of competition and 
dynamics operating in the grocery industry and the interplay between retail 
competitors and their relations with suppliers.  Additionally, the papers focus on 
understanding how competitive interaction can influence marketing decisions, 
principally over prices and product choices offered to consumers.  In turn, this can 
have consequences for policymakers and regulators seeking to ensure that retail 
grocery markets are competitive in delivering efficient outcomes (e.g. in terms of 
“PQRS” - prices, quality, range and service).  
This concluding section summarises the research contribution of the papers 
individually and collectively, my own individual contribution to the co-authored 
publications, the limitations of the papers and what these offer as opportunities for 
future research, the current impact of the papers and future research agenda, and 
closing remarks. 
 
5.1 Summary of research contributions   
The portfolio of nine papers relate to the wider set out of outputs from three 
funded research projects financed by UK research councils.  Paper 1, Paper 2 
and Paper 9 contribute directly with empirical papers to the £200,000 Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded project “Price Dynamics in Food 
Retailing in Great Britain” (with Michael Waterson, Jonathan Seaton and Paul 
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Dobson) (ESRC Grant RES-062-23-1962). In addition, Paper 5, Paper 6, Paper 7 
and Paper 8 provide supporting analytical modelling and competitive assessment 
analysis to understand better the competitive dynamics of pricing competition and 
interaction between suppliers and retailers.  Paper 3 contributes directly to the 
£1.1m Medical Research Council (MRC) funded project “Alcohol Policy Modelling 
and Evaluation” (led by Petra Maier and involving Paul Dobson and Jon Seaton 
as fellow co-investigators) (MRC Grant G1000043).  Paper 4 contributes directly 
to the £100,000 ESRC funded project “The Impact of Retail Pricing on Overeating 
and Food Waste” (with Paul Dobson, Eitan Gerstner and Jon Seaton) (ESRC 
Grant RES-000-22-3524).   
The substantial funding received for the three research projects, totalling 
£1.4m, indicates the importance of the subject matter that the UK government-
backed research councils placed on the research undertaken.  The projects have 
developed high impact research outputs that have contributed to the academic 
literature and for the benefit of non-academic users.  This subsection focuses on 
the academic research contribution of the papers, while subsection 5.3 (below) 
addresses the broader impact on other stakeholders (including industry, 
government bodies, and the media). 
In their own right, the set of nine papers provide an important academic 
research contribution to existing literatures on retail marketing.  The papers offer a 
blend of methodological, analytical and policy contributions through novel 
empirical, theoretical and competitive assessment analyses.  The set of papers 
provides new insights on hitherto under-researched areas, notably through highly 
disaggregated price studies of how UK retailers set and adjust their prices, and 
the nature, character and effects of competition between brands and private 
 34 
 
labels in the context of tensions in supply chain relations between grocery 
producers and retailers. The rest of this sub-section sets out the individual 
research contributions of each of the nine papers. 
Paper 1 contributes to the literature on the competition effects of retail 
mergers.  Other academic studies tend to focus on effects measured in terms of 
price levels (e.g. Hosken et al. 2012; Alain et al. 2017), whereas in contrast this 
paper shows how pricing behaviour in more general ways changed, going beyond 
price levels to look at price variability, price dispersion, and price leadership.  The 
analysis does not simply look at “before and after” effects, e.g. through difference-
in-difference analysis (Hosken and Tenn 2015), but instead looks at how price 
competition evolves in the wake of a major merger, recognising that different 
retailers may respond differently to the merger.  Our findings show that the merger 
had the effect of stimulating rather than restricting price competition, in contrast 
with much of the extant literature, which often find major retail mergers to be 
anticompetitive.  The findings also support the conclusions and reasoning of the 
Competition Commission inquiry to allow Morrisons to acquire Safeway as a pro-
competitive merger despite consolidating the UK retail sector (CC 2003).  The 
paper is relevant to researchers undertaking analysis of retail mergers (e.g. as 
cited by Argentesi et al. 2016) and analysis of food pricing (e.g. as cited by Lan 
and Dobson 2017). 
Paper 2 is novel in terms of the length of the period covered (with seven 
years of weekly price data) and the matching of products against retailers to 
provide a balanced panel of product prices for the three leading retailers in the UK 
retail grocery sector.  The standout contribution of this paper is to show how 
flexible are prices, which contrasts sharply with the existing literature which is 
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predominantly made up of US pricing studies.  The findings challenge the widely 
held view that menu costs (i.e. costs of changing prices) are so significant that 
they make retailers reluctant to change prices frequently (Levy et al. 1997; 
Anderson et al. 2015).  Prices are much more flexible than previously thought.  In 
addition, the paper provides evidence that the price churning that occurred in the 
economic crisis period (2008-10), with retailers adopting a frenzy of penny price 
cuts and temporary price discounts, served as an obfuscation strategy to mask 
rapid price inflation considerably raising overall basket prices.  This is important 
evidence that is directly relevant to research in the behavioural economics field 
looking at misleading or confusing pricing (e.g. as cited by Ater and Gerlitz 2017). 
This is also important in developing insights on price leadership in grocery 
retailing (e.g. as cited by Seaton and Waterson 2013). 
Paper 3 provides the first highly disaggregated pricing study of tax increases 
on alcohol at item level across different retailers.  As such it makes a contribution 
to public health research, especially in the context of whether setting a minimum 
price on alcohol would be more effective at curbing excessive consumption than 
excise duty increases or banning below cost selling (e.g. as cited by Brennan et 
al. 2014).  The paper is also methodologically important in terms of its quantile 
regression analysis and economic methods to assess tax pass-through (e.g. as 
cited by Shrestha and Markowitz 2016). 
Paper 4 provides the first theoretical analysis to explain the practice of value 
size pricing and policy measures that could counter harmful public health and 
economic effects of the practice when applied to sugary drinks.  Thus far, analysis 
of soda taxes and other measures to curb excessive consumption of sugary 
drinks have been predominantly empirical and have not tended to focus on the 
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issue of the size of drinks, which this paper addresses. The paper is contained in 
a special issue of Journal of Business Research on food portions and marketing, 
and the editorial explains the paper’s contribution in the context of other research 
in this field (Askegaard et al. 2017).   
Paper 5 provides an important overarching review of the application of retail 
buyer power in the context of UK grocery retailing.  The findings in the paper have 
relevance for research in other jurisdictions, including analysis of buyer power in 
the US (e.g. as cited by Kirkwood 2012).  The paper is also relevant to economic 
geography studies examining the exercise and application of retail buyer power in 
the context of market regulation (e.g. as cited by Wood and Alexander 2016).  
Paper 6 is novel in providing a balanced perspective of the pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive effects of brand and private label development, taking 
account of both immediate and dynamic competition.  This balanced perspective 
is important in what is often a highly polarised academic debate.  The paper 
makes a distinctive contribution in the retail marketing literature on brand and 
private label competition for its illustrations and characterisations (e.g. as cited by 
ter Braak et al. 2014; Olbrich and Grewe 2013; Schnittka 2015).  
Paper 7 provides novel insights on conducting competition assessments in 
examining the rivalry between brands and private labels.  This has been a 
relevant matter in a number of merger cases involving consumer packaged goods 
producers, but also relevant to examining retail buyer power in the context of 
assessing retail mergers or anticompetitive practices.  The key insight involves 
how prices of brands and private labels might appear unrelated and uncorrelated 
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because of the way that retailers might use the products as a consumer 
segmentation device. 
Paper 8 develops very detailed and extensive modelling to provide novel 
insights on different bargaining structures between retailers and brand producers 
and how this can affect the competition between brands and private labels.  The 
paper provides a significant contribution through looking at both competition policy 
and intellectual property rights policy issues in considering how retailers may have 
a strong incentive to design private labels that mimic brands as closely as 
possible by developing near-identical lookalike equivalents.  
Paper 9 provides novel empirical analysis through examining a balanced 
panel of matched brands and private label equivalents to examine their pricing 
behaviour over a long period (spanning five years) across competing retailers.  
This is a novel study in terms of examining both inter-product competition and 
inter-retailer competition.  The context is very important in view of ongoing 
concerns of brand producers that retailers deliberately favour private label over 
brands in a number of ways, including brand delisting trials, comparative 
advertising, and through selective shelf allocation.  This is the first detailed 
empirical study on a wide range of grocery products to investigate whether 
retailers use strategic pricing to favour private label. 
 
5.2 Individual contribution to co-authored publications 
In respect of my own individual contribution to each of the nine publications, 
Table 3 (below) summarises the work that I undertook regarding each publication.  
These papers were genuine collaborations amongst the co-authors, so in most 
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cases there is considerable overlap in the roles played by the co-authors.  
Nonetheless, Table 4 focuses on my main contributions to each of the nine 
publications, mostly drawing on my distinctive marketing expertise (in view of the 
other co-authors being economists).  My specialist retail marketing background 
allowed me to make specific contributions to the papers in respect of observing 
and interpreting retailer marketing and pricing practices in the UK context as well 
as familiarity with the relevant marketing literatures and main research techniques 
in the marketing field, as opposed to other co-authors specialising in economic 
analysis.  As such, each co-author brought complementary skills and insights to 
bear in developing the papers. 
Table 4: Individual contribution to the nine publications 
Individual 
contribution 
Specific contribution to each paper 
Paper 1 
 
Literature review, insights on grocery retailing practices, 
interpretation of pricing behaviour, editing 
Paper 2 
 
Literature review, insights on grocery retailing practices, 
interpretation of pricing behaviour, analysis of retailer 
advertising, editing 
Paper 3 
 
Review of grocery retailing practices, interpretation on pricing 
behaviour, interpretation of results, editing 
Paper 4 
 
Literature review, insights on grocery retailing practices, policy 
implications, co-writing and editing 
Paper 5  Literature review, review of Competition Commission studies 
and data interpretation, co-writing and editing 
Paper 6 
 
Literature review, data organisation, tables, diagrams, 
argumentation, examples, illustrations, co-writing and editing 
Paper 7 
 
Literature review, case review, argumentation, policy 
interpretation, co-writing and editing 
Paper 8 
 
Literature review, policy interpretation, case reviews, 
argumentation, co-writing and editing 
Paper 9 
 
Literature review, data analysis, argumentation, grocery 
retailing practices, discussion, interpretation of results, writing 
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As a collection of papers, the portfolio demonstrates my contribution to 
advancing understanding of retail marketing through careful and rigorous 
empirical and theoretical analysis.  This is an unusual combination, not least, as 
marketing academics typically specialise either in empirical analysis or in theory 
analysis, but rarely both.  Equally, what I have sought to bring to the work is a 
deeper understanding of the developments taking place in the grocery sector 
using the lens of economics but in conjunction with the literatures on marketing 
strategy and the psychology of consumer behaviour, to understand more about 
how retailers respond in competitive situations in developing their proposition to 
consumers.  I would contend that there has been too little such work in the UK, 
where it is largely North American based marketing academics that have led this 
field (with the notable exception of the very high quality marketing research 
coming from the Netherlands on grocery retailing over recent years). 
Through the process of developing these papers over the past decade, I 
have been able to draw on my growing expertise and detailed knowledge about 
retailer practices.  This has been a continuous investment of my time because it 
involves studying not just the academic literature but also the professional 
literature and media coverage on grocery retailing.  This has been important in 
respect of my ability to contribute examples of practices and outcomes from the 
grocery sector that enrich the papers and demonstrate their real-world relevance 
to retail managers and marketers.  This helps to ensure that the papers have 
genuine impact for the industry as well as for informing consumers, especially in 
view of the media coverage these papers and my related work have received.  
Additionally, it has also helped with my teaching Retail Management over the past 
decade, but likewise this teaching has fed back into and informed the research. 
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5.2 Research limitations and future research opportunities 
As with any research publications, there are inevitably limitations as to what 
can be covered and achieved in a single publication.  Additionally, advances in 
research may provide new and better techniques for undertaking empirical and/or 
theoretical analysis.  Furthermore, there may be limitations in the data, the 
methods employed, and how far the analysis can provide conclusive and 
compelling findings in view of extraneous effects, events and non-modelled 
aspects.   Certainly, all these aspects are relevant to some degree for the set of 
nine papers in the portfolio.  This sub-section examines the research limitations of 
each of the papers and the future research opportunities offered.  
For Paper 1 the sample size is impressive in the balanced panel price data 
set but the absence of sales (i.e. quantity) data means that it was not possible to 
conduct any formal structural merger simulation analysis.  The paper 
acknowledges this limitation and refers to the analysis undertaken by Skrainka 
(2012) examining the Safeway/Morrisons merger.  Despite this limitation, the 
paper uses the price data in ways not previously employed in empirical studies on 
merger analysis, noticeably examining issues concerned with price dispersion, 
price volatility and price leadership.  Future studies might wish to examine these 
issues on price effects along with examining the impact on sales and ideally 
margins if there are data available on sales volumes and retail costs. 
For Paper 2, the obvious limitation is in how far empirical evidence can go in 
demonstrating that retailers were employing an obfuscation strategy as a 
deliberate policy beyond just pricing competitively.  The market circumstances 
were exceptional, given the severity of the economic crisis, and the identified 
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patterns of pricing behaviour could be unique to the timeframe covered.  There is 
certainly a research opportunity in extending the study period to examine how 
pricing behaviour has evolved during the course of this current decade (given that 
the data in the paper only goes up to November 2010). 
Paper 3 has a similar limitation to Paper 1 in that the absence of quantity 
data means that it is difficult to discern the full economic effects of tax pass-
through, since ultimately the tax issue is about the effect on consumption levels, 
not just price levels.  Even so, this limitation is common to many studies on tax 
pass-through.  If quantity data were available, then an interesting line of enquiry 
would be to examine the impact of excise duty changes on different consumer 
groups, to examine distributional issues as well as the overall impact. 
Paper 4 provides a monopoly model of pricing, treating the food vendor as 
effectively having a captive market in making pricing offers on different product 
sizes.  This might not be an implausible assumption if consumers buy impulsively 
when in store or at a restaurant (i.e. they choose where to shop before they 
choose what to buy).  However, an interesting and very novel development would 
be to look at value size pricing in an oligopoly context where there are competing 
food vendors selling sugary drinks.  The interest would be to see if competition 
exacerbates or reduces the tendency of retailers to use value size pricing.  
The limitation for Paper 5 and academic research in general in the area of 
supply chain relations is that researchers do not generally have access to the data 
and information on how retailers and producers conduct their negotiations and 
agree on trading terms.  The paper draws mainly on information obtained during 
the course of competition authority investigations undertaken by the UK 
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Competition Commission in 2000, 2003 and 2008.  Since there has been no 
formal market investigation since 2008, it is not possible to determine whether 
retail buyer power has increased or decreased over the last decade in UK grocery 
retailing.  Moreover, even with the appointment of a Groceries Code Adjudicator in 
2013, there is no ongoing analysis on retail buyer power, other than reporting on 
breaches in respect of the Groceries Supply Code of Practice (GSCOP).6  
Accordingly, there are presently few options for taking empirical work on retailer 
buyer power forward at sector level. Thus, researchers might have to focus on 
theory analysis or wait for an opportunity to have access to otherwise private 
information on negotiated trading terms in supply chains before conducting 
empirical analysis. 
In respect of Paper 6, the main limitation is its piecemeal coverage by 
illustration rather than general empirical analysis and its focus mainly on the UK, 
to exclusion of examples and insights from other jurisdictions (including elsewhere 
in Europe and the US).  This presents a research opportunity to undertake a multi-
country analysis to examine whether the pro- and anti-competitive effects arising 
from brand and private label competition are weaker or stronger in other 
countries.  Thus far, international studies have mostly focused on the pace of 
development of private label, without examining how this has affected relations 
between brand producers and retailers and their competitive responses (e.g. how 
this affected product pricing, product choice, and product innovation). 
For Paper 7, the analysis is limited to presenting the arguments on how to 
conduct a competition assessment for examining competition between brands and 
                                                           
6  For details, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/groceries-code-adjudicator 
(accessed on 7/1/2018). 
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private labels.  The chief purpose of the paper is to provide guidance to 
researchers and practitioners.  However, in doing so, the paper does not provide 
any empirical analysis of its own, and so presents an opportunity for future 
research.  In particular, there is a research opportunity for undertaking a long 
duration study to examine how changing market developments over time are 
affecting not just prices but product innovation as well, in view of claims from 
brand producers that private labels free ride on their brand investments and 
thereby undermines their incentive to invest in product innovation.  This is an 
intriguing aspect since freeriding might undermine the profit motive for brand 
innovation but could provide a strong competitive motive for innovation (for the 
brand to stay a step ahead in quality terms over copycat private label goods).  An 
empirical study might be able to discern if primary “must-stock” brand producers 
innovate differently to secondary brand producers, given the latter are at greater 
risk of delisting and displacement compared to the former. 
For Paper 8, as with Paper 4, the main limitation is that the focus on a single 
(monopoly) retailer, but here in the presence of both vertical and horizontal 
competition with a brand producer (with Figure 2 representing the relationships 
modelled). There is scope to extend this analysis to examine competition between 
retailers, to see how this affects incentives to develop private label and how to set 
prices of both brands and private label.  A further limitation of the analysis is that it 
is the model is static in nature.  An intriguing aspect might be to extend the 
analysis to examine dynamic pricing.  There is an established marketing literature 
on dynamic pricing (e.g. Raman and Chatterjee 1995), but this has not yet been 
applied in the context of brand and private label rivalry.  Another limitation is the 
focus on pricing to the exclusion of other marketing choices, like promotions and 
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advertising. Again, there is established literature on the interaction effects across 
the marketing mix (e.g. Naik et al. 2005), and applying insights from this literature 
might offer new modelling opportunities. 
Paper 9 has the same limitation as Paper 1 and Paper 2 in not having 
access to sales (quantity) data and having to rely only on price data.  In addition, 
the question posed by the paper, in respect of whether grocery retailers 
manipulate brand prices to favour private label, is a challenge to demonstrate 
formally. The best the paper can do is to identify particular patterns of pricing 
behaviour where there are striking differences in the treatment of brand prices and 
private label and offer insights on what these differences demonstrate.  If sales 
volume data were available at item level (to match the price data) then it would be 
possible to see if the price manipulation had a material effect on the sales levels 
of the brands and private labels. Instead, the paper has to draw inferences on 
category-level market shares of private label about the effects on sales.  
Nonetheless, the research question is intriguing and worthy of further study with a 
dataset that has both price and quantity data. 
 
5.3 Impact and research agenda 
Beyond the impact of the research on the academic community, the findings 
of the papers have received extensive media coverage and featured widely in 
policy reports, presentations and discussions.  This subsection outlines this 
broader coverage and the wider impact of the research on non-academic users.  
First, sub-subsection 5.3.1 details the media coverage received relating both 
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directly and indirectly to the papers.  Second, sub-subsection 5.3.2 outlines the 
policy impact and contribution of the research papers. 
 
5.3.1 Media coverage 
In respect of media coverage, the finding of penny price cutting detailed by 
Paper 2, but also featuring in Paper 1 and Paper 8, received national press 
coverage for the working paper version of the paper (Chakraborty et al. 2011).  
Paper 3 on alcohol tax pass-through received specialist media coverage in both 
the health media and beverage industry media. Furthermore, Paper 4, on pricing 
of sugary drinks and the role of a soda tax or soft drinks industry levy to curb 
consumption also received extensive national media coverage.  In addition, there 
was media coverage and interviews undertaken in respect of the comparability of 
brands and equivalent private labels.  Table 5 (below) summarises the media 
coverage (up to 1/3/2018) in relation to these papers and the associated research.    
Following the media coverage on these research papers and in recognition 
of my research expertise on retail marketing, different media organisations and 
publications contacted me with requests for commentary, interviews and quotes 
on a range of related grocery pricing issues.  The subjects covered notably 
include “shrinkflation” (where products shrink in size but the price remains the 
same), as well as discount pricing, price variability, pricing to avoid food waste, 
and price inflation. Table 6 (below) summarises the additional media coverage (up 
to 1/3/2018) that indirectly relates to the research in the portfolio and explicitly 
quote my views and observations on a series of retail marketing matters.  
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Table 5: Media coverage directly relating to papers in the portfolio 
Issue Media coverage 
Penny price 
cutting and 
price 
manipulation 
by grocery 
retailers 
(Paper 2) 
Eastern Daily Press (22/4/2015), Calls for supermarket inquiry over pricing, p. 11 
Daily Mirror (5/3/2012), Supermarket cuts ‘rip-off’, p. 18. 
Sunday Times (4/3/2012), Shoppers pay more in sham price-cutting, p. 18.  
The Times (19/5/2011), Can you feed a family on fifty quid a week? T2 p. 6-7. 
Daily Mail (5/3/2010), Why those supermarket ‘bargains’ end up costing you more. 
Guardian (22/2/2010), Every little helps? Supermarkets accused of 'cynical 
manipulation' over 1p cuts, p. 13. 
Alcohol tax 
pass-
through 
effects by 
grocery 
retailers 
(Paper 3) 
 
Off License News (21/11/2014) - Study points finger over duty hikes, p.2  
Alcohol Policy UK (14/7/2014) - http://www.alcoholpolicy.net/2014/07/ 
supermarkets-hindering-efforts-to-reduce-harmful-driking-says-sheffield-
researchdispatches-on-the-c.html  
Heart FM radio (27/6/2014) - http://www.heart.co.uk/eastanglia/news/local/uea-
findssupermarkets-shifting-alcohol-taxes/  
The Spirits Business (27/6/2014) - http://www.thespiritsbusiness.com/2014/06/ 
uksupermarketsshifting-alcohol-taxes/  
Medical News Today (25/6/2014) - http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/ 
278683.php  
MyScience (24/6/2014) - http://www.myscience.org.uk/wire/uk_supermarkets_ 
minimise_price_rises_for_the_cheapest_alcohol_when_taxes_are_increased2014-
Sheffield&rss=1  
ScienceNewsLine (24/6/2014) - 
http://www.sciencenewsline.com/articles/2014062414140042.html  
HealthCanal (24/6/2014) - http://www.healthcanal.com/substance-abuse/52372-
uksupermarkets-minimise-price-rises-for-the-cheapest-alcohol-when-taxes-
areincreased.html  
MedicalXpress (23/6/2014) - http://medicalxpress.com/news/2014-06-
uksupermarkets-minimise-price-cheapest.html  
Science 2.0 (23/6/2014) - http://www.science20.com/news_articles/higher_ 
alcohol_taxes_just_lead_to_fewer_price_increases_for_cheapest_alcohol-139176 
Sugar in 
diets and 
need to 
reduce 
consumption 
of sugary 
drinks 
(Paper 4) 
The Times (8/2/2017), Britons are sugar addicts, says minister. 
The Sun (8/2/2017), Pop at sugar deals. 
Daily Mail (8/2/2017), Obesity czar: we need a revolution to break children’s sugar 
addiction.  
Daily Mirror (7/2/2017), Our children eat more sugar than kids in any other country 
in Europe. 
BeverageDaily.com (16/1/2017) - Can a soda tax discourage go large?  
European Union News (15/1/2017) – A sugary drinks tax has wider economic as 
well as health benefits 
Scotsman (30/1/2013), Health tax on fizzy drinks to cost jobs, MSP warns. 
Brands and 
private 
labels 
(Paper 8 & 
Paper 9) 
Channel 4 TV – Supershoppers, series 4 episode 1 – 27/11/2017 (discussing 
whether some supermarket value ranges are identical to their pricier standard own 
label ranges) 
Daily Mirror (31/1/2018), Bloopermarket: Shoppers fork out for own-brand foods 
'identical to value products', p. 6 
Daily Mail (25/11/2017), Stores’ value and own-brand food ranges are identical 
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Table 6: Media coverage indirectly relating to papers in the portfolio 
Price 
variability  
Daily Mail (30/9/2017), How online giants like Amazon can rip you off  
Discount 
retailing 
Channel 4 TV – Supershoppers, series 3 episode 1 – 6/6/2017 (discussing why 
discount retailers selling unique pack sizes might not provide the best value) 
BBC News (6/5/2015), Election 2015: Can the 'Lidl class' be swayed by political 
promises?  
Shrinkflation ITV – Save Money: Good Food, series 2 episode 6 – 9/1/2018 (discussing 
shrinkflation where food pack size shrinks but the price remains the same)  
Daily Mail (27/9/2017), Crumbs! Now there are two fewer Jaffa Cakes per pack. 
Daily Star (25/7/2017), Chocolate bars ARE getting smaller...and HERE is the 
proof  
Daily Mail (25/7/2017), 2,500 products have shrunk in last 5 years -   
Good Housekeeping (24/7/2017), Over 2,500 products have shrunk in size, but 
cost the same  
The Times (13/4/2017), The incredible shrinking curry sauces, p. 15 
The Sun (10/4/2017), Raw dhal: Sharwood relabels cooking sauces to serve four 
people instead of three – but the size and price stays the same -  
Mail on Sunday (5/3/2017) - Cheesed off! Families roundly cheated  
Daily Mirror (5/3/2017), Why those trendy new oval pizzas you see in major 
supermarkets may not be worth it 
El Confidencial (Spain) (28/2/2017), ‘Shrinkflation’: los britanicos va pagan mas 
por sus productos debido al Brexit (‘Shrinkflation’: Britons already pay more for 
their products due to Brexit)  
The Times (20/2/2017) - Shoppers count cost of shrinkflation, p.12  
Good Housekeeping (20/2/2017), Why Brexit is shrinking our shopping 
The Sun (19/2/2017), Bang out of order: How food is shrinking in supermarkets 
but price remains the same 
Mail on Sunday (18/2/2017), The great Brexit banger con 
The Independent (Ireland) (26/11/2016), Black Friday goes on - but beware ‘dirty 
discount’, ‘price creep’ and ‘shrinkflation’  
BBC News (9/11/2016), Toblerone's trim: Is this the thin end of the wedge? -   
The Independent (Ireland) (9/11/2016), Shrinking Toblerone ‘is not because of 
Brexit’ - maker  
Belfast Telegraph (9/11/2016),  Mind the gap: Toblerone bars get smaller as 
costs rise  
CNN Money (8/11/2016), Toblerone changes its iconic shape and chocoholics go 
crazy  
Irish Times (8/11/2016), Toblerone orm: chocolate bars feel wrath of 
‘shrinkflation’  
Pricing to 
avoid food 
waste 
Eastern Daily Press (4/12/2017), Supermarket chain sells food past best before 
dates to cut waste  
Price 
inflation 
BBC Radio Norfolk - 8/11/2016 (discussing inflation with Matthew Gudgin)  
 48 
 
5.3.2 Policy impact and engagement 
In addition to the extensive media coverage, a number of policy reports and 
policy discussions have referenced and featured the research in the Portfolio.  
This policy contribution falls into three areas: firstly, alcohol policy in relation to 
Paper 3; secondly, childhood obesity policy and specifically the Soft Drinks 
Industry Levy in relation to Paper 4; thirdly, competition policy on supply chain 
competition and competition between brands and private labels in relation to 
Paper 1, Paper 2, Paper 5 and Paper 6.  The rest of the subsection addresses 
these three policy areas in turn. 
Firstly, policy reports and submissions relating to alcohol policy for the 
Department of Health for England & Wales, the Scottish Government, the House 
of Lords on EU Alcohol Strategy, and the Irish Ministry for Finance cite Paper 3.  
The results of the paper and its implications have been informing the policy 
debate for the Department of Health in England & Wales as well as in Scotland as 
it assesses minimum pricing on alcohol.  In addition to citations in academic 
medical journals (including British Medical Journal, The Lancet, PLoS Medicine 
and Addiction), this paper has also been cited in the House of Lords, European 
Union Committee, Home Affairs, Health and Education Sub-Committee report on 
EU Alcohol Strategy.7  Public Health England cite the paper in their report on “The 
public health burden of alcohol: evidence review” (December 2016).8  The paper 
is also relevant to policy debate over national budgets.  For example, the Irish 
                                                           
7 Written Evidence Volume, p. 103, 2014, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-sub-com-f/eu-alcohol-strategy/alcohol-strategy-evidence.pdf (last accessed 
7/1/2018). 
8 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-public-health-burden-of-alcohol-evidence-
review (last accessed 7/1/2018) 
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National Off-Licence Association (NOffLA) cites the paper in its submission to the 
Irish Minister for Finance for the 2016 Budget.9 
Secondly, the research in Paper 4 features in the deliberations of the House 
of Commons Health Committee, in reviewing the UK government’s Childhood 
Obesity Plan.  My co-author, Paul Dobson, presented oral evidence to the Select 
Committee on 7th February 2017.10  The Committee’s subsequent review report 
published on 27th March 2017 features the evidence.11  In particular, section 4 of 
the Health Committee’s report at paragraph 50 reiterates the call for policy 
measures that explicitly “should be designed to reduce the overall number of 
promotions of unhealthy foods and drinks.”  Paragraph 52 quotes my co-author in 
explaining the basis of our research and why sugary carbonated drinks are 
particularly prone to value size pricing and the public health need to curb 
discounting on large size that induces excessive consumption.  In line with our 
research findings and policy conclusions, at paragraph 56 the Health Committee 
urge the Government to regulate to further reduce the impact of deep discounting 
and price promotions on sales of unhealthy food.12  Following the oral evidence to 
the Health Committee, both Public Health England and PepsiCo (the second 
largest sugary drinks producer in the UK) requested meetings to find out more on 
our research.  A meeting duly took place with PepsiCo at their London offices.  A 
meeting with Public Health England is pending.  Subsequently, the Centre for 
                                                           
9 https://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/finance/1318.-Pre-Budget-Submission---
National-Off-Licence-Association.pdf (last accessed 7/1/2018) 
10 See http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/health-
committee/news-parliament-20151/childhood-obesity-follow-up-evidence-16-17/ (last accessed 
7/1/2018). 
11  See https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhealth/928/92802.htm 
(last accessed 7/1/2018). 
12 See https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhealth/928/928.pdf (last 
accessed 7/1/2018). 
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Social Justice report “Office the Scales: Tackling England’s childhood obesity 
crisis” (December 2017) expressly cites the paper in the context of a policy 
recommendation intended to curb the practice of value size pricing.13 
Thirdly, several of the papers and their research findings feature in 
presentations and reports in respect of competition authorities and the 
development and application of competition policy.  In respect of presentations, 
the findings in Paper 1 (under the title “Pricing Developments in UK Supermarket 
Retailing”) were presented at a US Federal Trade Commission symposium on 
supermarkets (held in Washington DC, 24/5/2007). The findings in Paper 5 were 
presented to an American Antitrust Institute symposium on buyer power (held in 
Washington DC, 20/6/2007).  The findings in Paper 2 (under the title “Pricing 
behaviour in British supermarkets: obfuscation and leadership”) were presented in 
a seminar to the UK Office of Fair Trading (held in London, 11/7/2012).  The 
findings in respect of Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 3 (under the title “Supermarket 
Pricing in the UK: Recent Research Findings on Consumer Price Dynamics & 
Retailer Behaviour”) were presented at a DEFRA/AES conference on “Consumers 
and Food Baskets: Beyond the Farm-Gate” (held in London, 15/12/2014).  
In respect of reports relating to competition policy, the findings in relation to 
Paper 1 feature in a submission from the Association of Convenience Stores to 
the 2008 UK Competition Commission inquiry on grocery retailing (CC 2008).14   
                                                           
13 See https://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/core/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CSJ-Off-The-
Scales-Obesity-Report.pdf (last accessed 7/1/2018).  The report cites Paper 4 in making the 
following policy recommendation: “requiring food vendors to use proportional pricing on HFSS 
products, so that unit prices are the same across the product size range, would eliminate the 
pecuniary incentive for consumers to ‘go large’ in choosing ‘bargain’ large portion sizes over 
‘expensive’ smaller alternatives” (p. 89). 
14  See the report “Micro-Marketing and Discriminatory Practices in UK Grocery Retailing”, p. 50 
discussing an early version of Paper 1, finding falling retail prices with rising retail market 
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The findings in respect of Paper 5 on buyer power feature in a 2014 report by the 
German Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) for its sector inquiry on food retailing 
examining the structure and procurement behaviour in German food retail 
markets.15  Similarly, the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) cites 
Paper 5 in a 2009 report on “Competition in the Grocery Market”.16 Also, an 
OECD report from 2009 by the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs on 
“Monopsony and Buyer Power” (DAF/COMP(2008)38, 17/12/2009, p. 62) cites 
Paper 5.17  The Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet) in a report 
on food chain competition cites an earlier version of Paper 5 (Dobson and 
Chakraborty 2007).18 A report for the European Commission DG Enterprise in 
2011 on “The impact of private labels on the competitiveness of the European 
food supply chain” cites Paper 6, regarding brand and private label competition.19  
Future research that I will be developing will continue with the intention to 
make an academic contribution along with informing the public through media 
coverage and having an impact on public health policy and competition policy. 
                                                           
concentration; http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070705170044/http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/main_party_submissions_acs_micro_marketing.p
df (accessed 8/1/2018). 
15 See the report “Sektoruntersuchung Lebensmitteleinzelhandel: Darstellung und Analyse der 
Strukturen und des Beschaffungsverhaltens auf den Märkten des Lebensmitteleinzelhandels in 
Deutschland” Bericht gemäß § 32 e GWB, September 2014 (citing Paper 5 on p. 66) 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/Sektoruntersuchung_LEH.pdf%3F__blob%3DpublicationFile%26v
%3D7 (accessed 8/1/2018).  
16  See 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/publikationer/uppdragsforskning/konkurrensen-pa-
dagligvarumarknaden.pdf (accessed 8/1/2018) 
17 See 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2008)38&doc
Language=En (accessed 8/1/2018). 
18  See http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/globalassets/vedtak-og-
uttalelser/uttalelser/2011/konkurransetilsynets-horingssvar-til-nou-2011-4.pdf 
19  See http://www.socr.cz/file/197/retailer-own-brands-and-competitiveness-europen-commission-
study.pdf (accessed 8/1/2018). 
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5.4 Concluding remarks  
This introductory chapter provides commentary on the portfolio of published 
papers to explain the common theme of the nine papers and their linkage as a 
coherent whole.  The chapter places the articles in a theoretic context provided by 
the wider literature, explains the methodology in the papers, suggests what further 
work needs to be done, and indicates my contribution to co-authored publications, 
alongside their individual and collective academic research contribution and wider 
contribution to non-academic users through media coverage and policy impact. 
Collectively, the published papers deliver a significant research contribution. 
The papers with my own contribution provide evidence of training in and the 
application of research methods appropriate to the field of study in retail 
marketing.  The portfolio contributes to theory, knowledge and discussion in this 
field of study.  The common theme of the papers is competition in grocery 
retailing, and specifically the way that retail marketing strategy and supply chain 
relations affects retail competition and outcomes for consumers.  The portfolio, as 
a combination of empirical, analytical and competitive assessment studies, offers 
fresh understanding of how retailers compete through pricing and product choices 
in the context of grocery retailing and food purchases made by consumers.  The 
collection of papers advances research in the field as well as provides findings 
with broad interest, including for the general public, policymakers and regulators 
(as evident from the media coverage and policy impact).  
Grocery retailing continues to evolve.  In the UK, the competitive 
environment is changing, as more consumers shop for groceries online and shop 
at a greater repertoire of grocery stores, mixed across mainstream supermarkets, 
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discount retailers, and convenience stores.  This has blurred market boundaries, 
as one-stop shopping has given way to multi-stop shopping, and as different 
formats of retailers compete with each other for a share of the consumer’s wallet 
or purse.  New research has the opportunity to study this increasing inter-format 
competition, and the fickle nature of consumers’ store choices and shopping 
habits.  The availability of increasingly detailed datasets of consumers’ purchasing 
behaviour, using consumer panel or loyalty card data, offers fresh research 
opportunities to examine how the evolving competitive environment is influencing 
consumer spending, but equally how consumer spending is shaping that 
competitive environment.  This is an exciting time to be conducting research in the 
field of retail marketing and one in which I hope to continue making important 
contributions through building on the research papers that make up this portfolio 
of papers and demonstrating my expertise and knowledge about the grocery 
retailing sector and ongoing developments in retail marketing.  
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